Memory attributions for choices: How beliefs shape our memories by Henkel, Linda A. & Mather, M.
Fairfield University 
DigitalCommons@Fairfield 
Psychology Faculty Publications Psychology Department 
2007 
Memory attributions for choices: How beliefs shape our 
memories 
Linda A. Henkel 
Fairfield University, lhenkel@fairfield.edu 
M. Mather 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/psychology-facultypubs 
Copyright 2007 Elsevier, Journal of Memory and Language 
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of 
Memory and Language. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, 
editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be 
reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted 
for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Memory and 
Language, [57, 2 (2007)] DOI: 10.1016/j.jml.2006.08.012 
Peer Reviewed 
Repository Citation 
Henkel, Linda A. and Mather, M., "Memory attributions for choices: How beliefs shape our memories" 
(2007). Psychology Faculty Publications. 8. 
https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/psychology-facultypubs/8 
Published Citation 
Henkel, L. A., & Mather, M. (2007). Memory attributions for choices: How beliefs shape our memories. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 57.2, 163-176. 
This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rights-
holder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@fairfield.edu. 
Memory attributions   1 
 
 
 
 
Running Head:  MEMORY ATTRIBUTIONS FOR CHOICES 
 
 
 
 
 
Memory Attributions for Choices: How Beliefs Shape Our Memories 
 
Linda A. Henkel 
 
Fairfield University 
 
Mara Mather 
 
University of California at Santa Cruz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Address correspondence to: 
Linda Henkel 
Department of Psychology 
Fairfield University 
Fairfield, CT  06824 
203-254-4000x3269 
lhenkel@mail.fairfield.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
Memory attributions   2 
 
Abstract 
When remembering past choices, people tend to attribute positive features to chosen options and 
negative features to rejected options. The present experiments reveal the important role beliefs 
play in memory reconstruction of choices.  In Experiment 1, participants who misremembered 
which option they chose favored their believed choice in their memory attributions more than 
their actual choice.  In Experiment 2, we manipulated participants' beliefs by either "reminding" 
participants they chose an option they actually rejected or providing a correct reminder. 
Participants' memory attributions favored the option they believed they chose, both when that 
belief was correct and when it was erroneous.  Furthermore, features attributed in a fashion 
favoring believed choices were more vividly remembered than features attributed in a non 
choice-supportive fashion.  Thus beliefs at the time of retrieval about a choice lead to memory 
biases about both the valence and the vividness of remembered choice option features. 
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Memory Attributions for Choices: How Beliefs Shape Our Memories 
 Goals and beliefs at the time of memory retrieval often have a powerful influence on the 
way that memories are reconstructed.  For example, convincing people to believe that frequent 
tooth brushing is harmful rather than beneficial leads them to recall brushing their teeth less 
often in the past few weeks (Ross, McFarland, & Fletcher, 1981), and convincing people to 
believe that extroversion is superior or inferior to introversion affects how many extroverted 
behaviors they recall engaging in (Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990).   
 An important part of reconstructing events is attributing information to its appropriate 
source (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).  For instance, was it Paul or Sue who told that 
joke?  Did I actually lock the door or only imagine doing it?   Beliefs about the possible sources 
of what one remembers can affect the attributions made about those memories (e.g., Marsh, 
Cook, & Hicks, 2006; Mather, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1999; Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999; 
Spaniol & Bayen, 2002).  For instance, knowing that someone is Republican makes people more 
likely to attribute conservative-sounding statements to that person than to other potential sources 
(Mather et al., 1999).  Beliefs about how positive or negative a particular source is can also 
influence source attributions.  After people read a list of positive and negative behaviors engaged 
in by two men, those who learned that Geoff is a college professor, happy, married, and 
employed whereas Mark is a blue-collar employee, unhappy, divorced, and temporarily out of 
work were more likely later to attribute the positive behaviors on the list to Geoff and the 
negative behaviors to Mark (Cook, Marsh, & Hicks, 2003).  Wishful thinking can also play a role 
in memory attributions.  Participants who read a series of predictions by psychics and learn that 
one psychic is more often right in her predictions than the other psychic tend to attribute 
predictions with desirable outcomes to the accurate psychic and predictions with undesirable 
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outcomes to the inaccurate psychic (Gordon, Franklin, & Beck, 2005).  Furthermore, previous 
studies have shown that beliefs can influence source attributions even when the information 
about the sources is presented after initial encoding, and so the influence of beliefs extends 
beyond just directing attention when first learning information (Bayen, Nakamura, Dupuis, & 
Yang, 2000; Cook et al., 2003; Hicks & Cockman, 2003). Such work is consistent with the large 
body of studies showing that post-event information can impact the accuracy of what one 
remembers (e.g., Lane, Mather, Villa, & Morita, 2001; Pizarro, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2006; 
Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996). 
 The present studies seek to examine the extent to which beliefs can influence memory 
attributions about past choices.  The objective of a choice generally is to pick the best option.  
Thus, after making a choice, you are likely to harbor the belief that the chosen option was better 
than the options you rejected.  Motivation may also play a role in this process, as remembering 
the option that you chose as being the best option should help reduce regret about your choice.  
Indeed, several recent studies have shown that people tend to remember in ways that favor an 
option they had chosen over an option they had rejected.  Specifically, when participants selected 
which of two options they would choose (e.g., two potential apartment rentals), they later 
showed a choice-supportive bias in their memory attributions (Mather & Johnson, 2000; Mather, 
Shafir, & Johnson, 2000, 2003).  That is, they were more likely to attribute positive features 
(e.g., “sunny and bright”) to the option they chose and attribute negative features (e.g., “small 
bedroom”) to the option they rejected.  This bias in favoring the chosen option in memory occurs 
not only when people make the choice themselves but also when a choice is made on their behalf 
that they are led to believe is in their best interest (Benney & Henkel, 2006).  However, people 
do not show choice-supportive biases when choices are made randomly for them (Benney & 
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Henkel, 2006; Mather et al., 2003). 
Thus far research has provided important information about the circumstances under 
which choice-supportive biases in memory are more or less likely to occur. The findings from 
these studies showing that choice-supportive biases in memory occur when people make their 
choices purposefully but not when choices are made randomly suggest that the biases may be the 
result of people’s belief that the option they chose is better. However, other factors may have led 
to the memory attributions favoring the chosen option over the nonchosen option, such as 
selective encoding due to information search processes biased in favor of a preferred alternative 
(Brownstein, 2003) or dissonance reduction immediately after the choice (Festinger, 1957). To 
better understand the role that beliefs play in memory attributions about past choices, the present 
studies examine instances when people have an incorrect belief about what their previous choice 
was.  By placing beliefs about choices and the actual choice in opposition, we can isolate the 
effects of belief on memory for choices from other factors.   
In addition, in the second experiment, we examined the role of beliefs on the vividness 
and qualitative characteristics of the memories.  Although previous studies have examined how 
qualitative characteristics of false memories differ from characteristics of accurate memories 
(e.g., Arbuthnott, Geelen, & Kealy, 2002; Bredart, Lampinen, & Defeldre, 2003; Heaps & Nash, 
2001; Hoffman, Garcia-Palacios, Thomas, & Schmidt, 2001; Karpel, Hoyer, & Toglia, 2001; 
Kealy & Arbuthnott, 2003; Mather, Henkel, & Johnson, 1997; Neuschatz, Payne, Lampinen, & 
Toglia, 2001; Norman & Schacter, 1997), researchers have not investigated how beliefs about 
how desirable the memory is might influence its vividness.  When remembering features from 
past choice options, positive features of chosen options and negative features of rejected options 
should be more satisfying to remember than non choice-supportive features.  An interesting 
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question is whether the desirability of a particular memory might influence how vivid it feels. 
Participants in the present studies were given several descriptions of pairs of options 
(e.g., two potential cars, two potential roommates) and asked to choose one of the two options 
within each pair.  All options had both positive and negative features.  Later, participants were 
asked to remember which features had been associated with a given option.  Prior studies have 
found that participants sometimes misremember which of the two options they had originally 
chosen (e.g., Mather & Johnson, 2000). To maximize the possibility of this occurring, 
participants in the present studies completed the feature attribution memory task 2 days after 
having made their choices in Experiment 1 and 1 week later in Experiment 2.  If beliefs at the 
time of retrieval about the chosen option do indeed have an impact on memory attributions, then 
people’s attributions should favor the option that they believe they chose – whether their belief is 
correct (they really did choose that option) or incorrect (they are misremembering which option 
they chose).  Thus for both correctly remembered choices and incorrectly remembered choices, 
people should attribute relatively more positive features to the option they believe they chose, 
and more negative features to the option they believe they rejected. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants.  Eighty undergraduates participated for partial course credit (65 women and 
15 men).  Ages ranged from 18 to 24 years old (M = 21.8, SD = 6.6).  Three additional 
participants did not return for the second session and two other participants did not indicate 
which options they had chosen.  Data from these participants were not included in the analyses. 
Materials.  We used five choice scenarios that each included two options.  These were 
choices between roommates, summer internships, apartments, cars, and potential dating partners 
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(for an example, see the car choice in Table 1).  There were 10-12 features listed for each of the 
two options in a scenario. Each option included both positive and negative features, the valence 
of which was established through prior norms. An equal number of positive features were 
randomly assigned to each of the two options in a scenario, and an equal number of negative 
features were as well. Thus within a given scenario, both options had the same number of 
positive features and the same number of negative features. For each scenario, there was a 
separate memory test consisting of a randomly ordered list of the items from each option 
intermixed with three to five positive and three to five negative new features.  
Procedure.  Participants were asked to read through each choice scenario at their own 
rate and select one of the two options by circling it. Instructions emphasized that they should 
take their time and carefully make their choice for each scenario.  Each scenario was presented 
one at a time, and after participants made their choice, the next scenario was presented. The five 
scenarios were presented in a randomized order to each participant.  They returned 2 days later to 
complete the surprise memory tests in which they were asked to indicate which option they had 
originally chosen and which option each feature had been associated with, or whether it was 
new. Thus for each feature, they were to chose from three alternatives: option A, option B, or 
new.  The order of the memory tests was randomly determined for each participant. 
Results 
 An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical analyses and partial eta squared values 
(p
2
) are reported to indicate effect sizes. All t tests were two-tailed. 
Memory accuracy.   The proportion of studied items called old (“hits”), the proportion of 
new items called old (“false alarms”), and the proportion of hits correctly attributed to their 
original option are presented in Table 2 separately for scenarios with correctly remembered 
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choices and misremembered choices.  All participants correctly remembered at least some of 
their choices, and 50 participants were wrong about which option they chose for at least one 
choice.  Of these 50, 32 incorrectly remembered one choice, 15 incorrectly remembered two 
choices, 1 incorrectly remembered three choices, 2 incorrectly remembered 4 choices, and 0 
incorrectly remembered all 5 choices. The number of individuals who incorrectly remembered 
their choice for a given scenario ranged from 11 (14%) to 21 (26%).    
Individual t tests were conducted to compare memory performance for positive versus 
negative features for each of the 6 dimensions in Table 2. In general, participants were more 
accurate at remembering negative features than positive features (as in Mather & Johnson, 2000; 
but see also Mather, Knight, & McCaffrey, 2005, Experiment 3), and this was true for both old 
and new features (thus a “mirror effect’ was shown, Glanzer & Adams, 1985). Specifically, 
participants both recognized and identified the source of negative features more accurately than 
positive features (Rows 1, 3, and 4 of Table 2) and made fewer false alarms for negative than for 
positive features (Rows 2 and 5), with all 5 t tests yielding p < .005.  The only exception to this 
pattern of better memory for negative features than for positive features was the nonsignificant 
difference in participants’ source identification accuracy when they misremembered which 
option was chosen (Row 6), t(49) < 1. 
When comparing correctly remembered and misremembered choices for those 50 
participants who had at least one of both, there were no significant differences in hit or false 
alarm rates (both F<1), but participants’ source accuracy was significantly better when they 
correctly remembered which option they had chosen (M = .63, SE = .01) than when they 
misremembered which option they had chosen (M = .56, SE = .02), F(1, 49) = 9.30, MSE = .03, 
p<.01, p
2
=.16.  
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 Choice-supportive memory attributions. Of primary interest was the extent to which 
participants made attributions of positive and negative features to the chosen or rejected options. 
Source attributions were calculated in two different ways to assess this.  The first set of analyses 
use a dependent measure typically used in many studies of source monitoring (see Henkel & 
Franklin, 1998).  This is based on the proportion of studied features correctly attributed to the 
chosen or rejected option, given that the features were correctly recognized as old.  The second 
set of analyses use a dependent measure known as an asymmetry score that was developed 
specifically to examine choice-supportive memory attributions. Asymmetry scores were 
calculated using the method outlined by Mather et al. (2000) in order to reveal whether 
participants’ memory attributions favored their chosen options or not (i.e., whether they assigned 
relatively more positive features to the chosen option and more negative features to the rejected 
option).
1
  This particular measure is useful because it provides a composite score indicating the 
extent to which participants made attributions favoring the chosen or nonchosen option, thus 
allowing direct comparisons across conditions of the degree of choice-supportiveness.  In 
addition, this measure controls for spurious effects that may be due to unequal numbers of 
participants having selected one option over another when making their initial choice.
2
  Positive 
scores indicate attributions favoring the chosen option, and negative scores indicate attributions 
favoring the nonchosen option, with scores of zero showing a bias toward neither option.  
 Figure 1 presents the proportion of features attributed to the option remembered as 
chosen or rejected as a function of feature valence. The top left panel shows source attribution 
accuracy rates when participants correctly remembered which option was chosen, and the top 
right panel shows attributions when participants incorrectly remembered which option was 
chosen.  A 2 (feature valence: positive, negative) x 2 (option attributed to: remembered as 
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chosen, remembered as rejected) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted for the scenarios in 
which participants correctly remembered which option they chose, and a significant feature 
valence x option-attributed-to interaction was found, F(1, 79) = 25.74, p < .001, p
2
=.25.  As 
predicted, participants attributed more positive features to the chosen option than to the rejected 
option, t(79) = 6.32, p < .001. They attributed slightly though not significantly more negative 
features to the rejected option than to the chosen option, t(79) = 1.62, p = .10. 
 A separate 2 x 2 ANOVA was also conducted for the cases in which participants 
incorrectly remembered which option they chose, and again, a significant feature valence x 
option-attributed-to interaction was found, F(1, 49) = 103.71, p < .002, p
2
=.18.  Here, 
participants attributed significantly more positive features to the option they believed they chose 
than to the option they actually chose, t(49) = 29.92, p < .005, and they attributed more negative 
features to the option they believed they rejected than to the option they actually rejected, t(49) = 
2.27, p < .03. 
 Separate analyses were conducted for correctly remembered choices and for incorrectly 
remembered choices because not all participants incorrectly remembered a choice. Direct 
comparisons of attributions for correctly remembered choices and incorrectly remembered 
choices can be made only for the 50 participants who incorrectly remembered at least one of 
their choices. The direct comparison also revealed a significant feature valence x option-
attributed-to interaction, F(1, 49) = 17.08, p < .001, p
2
=.26, but no significant interaction 
between choice accuracy, feature valence, and option-attributed-to, F(1, 49) = 1.43, p = .24.  
Thus participants’ attributions were choice-supportive both for options that they correctly 
remembered and for options that they incorrectly remembered.   
Choice-supportive attribution biases can also be examined for new items erroneously 
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claimed as belonging to the chosen or rejected option. The proportion of positive and negative 
new items attributed to the option remembered as chosen or rejected was therefore examined 
both for scenarios in which participants correctly remembered their choices and for scenarios in 
which they incorrectly remembered their choices. These data are presented in the bottom panel 
of Figure 1. As in the analyses for studied items, a 2 x 2 ANOVA indicated a significant feature 
valence x option-attributed-to interaction for correctly remembered choices, F(1, 79) = 18.42, p 
< .001, p
2
=.19.  When participants correctly remembered which option was chosen, they 
attributed more positive features to the chosen option than to the rejected option, t(79) = 2.40, p 
< .01, and more negative features to the rejected option than to the chosen option, t(79) = 4.00, p 
< .001.  Likewise, a significant feature valence x option-attributed-to interaction was found for 
incorrectly remembered choices, F(1, 49) = 7.14, p < .01, p
2
=.13.  When participants 
misremembered which option was chosen, they attributed more positive features to the option 
they believed they chose than to the option they believed they rejected, t(49) = 2.51, p < .01, and 
slightly though not significantly more negative features to the option they believed they rejected 
than to option they believed they chose, t(49) = 1.51, p =  .14.  An additional analysis using only 
the subset of participants who misremembered at least one of their choices and correctly 
remembered the others showed a significant valence x option-attributed-to interaction as well, 
F(1, 49) = 17.39, p < .001, p
2
=.26, with no significant interaction between choice accuracy, 
feature valence, and option-attributed-to F(1, 49) = 0.14, p = .71.  Thus participants’ attributions 
of new items were choice-supportive both for options that they correctly remembered and for 
options that they incorrectly remembered.   
 Analyses were also conducted based on asymmetry scores for both correctly and 
incorrectly remembered choices, and the results of these analyses are consistent with the results 
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of analyses based on conditionalized proportions.   For the choices in which participants 
correctly remembered which option they had selected, asymmetry scores were significantly 
greater than zero, M = .28, SE =.06, t(79) = 4.63, p < .001, and thus revealed a bias favoring 
chosen options.  For the choices in which participants incorrectly remembered which option they 
chose, participants significantly favored the options they thought they chose, rather than the ones 
they actually chose (with positive scores indicating a bias in favor of remembered choices and 
against the actual choices), M  = .56, SE = .15, t(49) = 3.80, p <. 001.  Among the 50 participants 
who misremembered which option they had chosen for at least one scenario and correctly 
remembered which option they had chosen for other scenarios, there was no significant 
difference in how choice supportive they were for the correctly (M = .28, SE = .09) and 
incorrectly remembered choices (M  = .56, SE = .15), t(49) = 1.67, p =.10.  Shown in the top 
panel of Table 3 are the mean choice-supportive asymmetry scores for these 50 participants 
separately for correct and incorrect attributions of old features as well as for incorrect attributions 
of new features.  A 2 (Belief about which option was chosen: Correct, Incorrect) x 3 (Attribution 
type: Correct Old Feature, Incorrect Old Feature, Incorrect New Feature) ANOVA revealed no 
significant effects (all ps > .10).  Thus, participants had similar choice-supportive biases in their 
attributions for both old and new features.  
Discussion 
The present study assessed the impact of belief about choices on people’s attribution of 
positive and negative features to the options they believe they chose and the options they believe 
they rejected.  To create a situation where people would misremember some of their choices, a 2-
day delay between having made the choices and assessment of memory was used.  Recognition 
accuracy was reasonably high (the average hit rate was about 86%), even with this long retention 
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interval, and did not vary whether participants correctly or incorrectly remembered the chosen 
option.  Overall source identification accuracy was modest, especially when participants 
misremembered which option was chosen.  However, the absolute rates of source accuracy are a 
function of the very phenomenon under investigation.  That is, when participants misremember 
an option, we argue that their source attributions will be a function of which option they believe 
they chose rather than which option they actually chose.   
 The findings from Experiment 1 indicate that people’s memory attributions favor the 
option they believe they chose over the option they believe they rejected, even when they 
incorrectly remember which option was in fact chosen. This illustrates the strong impact belief at 
the time of retrieval can have on one’s memory.  Whereas prior studies have shown that beliefs 
are an important component of reconstructive memory processes in general (e.g., Cook et al., 
2003; Mather & Johnson, 2003; Mather et al., 1999), the role that beliefs play in memory 
attributions about past choices has not been addressed and was thus the primary focus of the 
present study. 
The fact that choice-supportive biases favoring the option believed to have been chosen 
over the option believed to have been rejected were found not only for features that were part of 
the original scenarios but also for new features that were not presented at all is important to note 
because it indicates that the bias cannot be accounted for solely by selective encoding.  While 
deciding which option to choose, participants may simply pay more attention to the positive 
features that draw them to the option they wind up choosing or to the negative features that lead 
them to reject the other option.  However, if this were the sole factor driving the later memory 
attributions, then attributions should be choice supportive for originally studied features but not 
for new features.   
Memory attributions   14 
The two different measures of source attributions used here allow further confidence in 
the conclusion that one’s beliefs about a choice can influence what one remembers about the 
chosen and rejected options.  Because the proportion measure that was used was conditionalized 
on correct recognition, the choice-supportive patterns obtained cannot simply be the byproduct 
of differential hit rates. Furthermore, although people tended to better remember negative rather 
than positive features overall (both in terms of their hit rates and their source attributions), they 
nonetheless showed different patterns of attributions for negative features depending on what 
option they believe they chose, and different patterns of attributions for negative over positive 
features depending on their beliefs about what option was chosen. In addition, the analyses using 
asymmetry scores also yielded patterns of choice-supportive attributions, based on a dependent 
measure that is not affected by spurious effects that may arise due to unequal numbers of 
participants selecting one option over the other in a given scenario. Taken together, these 
findings support the argument that beliefs – both correct and incorrect – about which option was 
chosen give rise to memory attributions that favor the option remembered as chosen over the 
option remembered as rejected. 
However, because participant’s beliefs about which options were chosen and which 
options were rejected were not directly manipulated, the results from the present study do not 
rule out the possibility that differences in the features best remembered can contribute to the bias 
shown.  It may be that a choice-supportive bias in memory attributions is not directly the result 
of a belief about choice per se.  Instead, people’s belief about which option they chose and the 
choice-supportive attributions they make may both be the outcome of which features are 
remembered best.  Specifically, if negative features from Option A are recalled most vividly, 
participants may both tend to believe they rejected that option (and chose the other option) and to 
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attribute positive features to the option they believe they chose and negative features to the 
option they believe they rejected.  If this were the case, beliefs about the choice itself would not 
play a critical role. Experiment 2 was thus designed to better understand the way in which beliefs 
about past choices shape one’s memories and attributions made about those memories. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we misled participants about which option they had chosen for some 
choices to more stringently test the role of belief about choices in choice-supportive memory 
biases. We gave participants a series of choices and then brought them back for memory tests 1 
week later.  At that point, we “reminded” them of which option they had chosen for each choice.  
For each participant, we misinformed them about two choices and correctly informed them about 
two choices.  If the belief that whichever option one chose was the better option is the critical 
factor underlying choice-supportive memory, choice-supportive biases should be just as strong in 
the misleading-reminder condition as in the correct-reminder condition. 
 This study also provided us with the opportunity to examine how beliefs about sources 
might influence the qualitative characteristics of the memories attributed to those sources.  In 
particular, we were interested in whether features attributed in a belief-consistent manner would 
seem more vivid than features that do not fit as well with one’s expectations. Previous studies 
examining the qualitative characteristics of memories have typically focused on how the 
characteristics differ depending on the source or nature of the memory.  For example, 
participants who hear a list of words that are all semantically related to a lure word and later 
incorrectly remember hearing the lure word give lower ratings of perceptual detail for the lure 
words than for the correctly remembered words (Mather et al., 1997; Norman & Schacter, 1997).   
Along the same lines, previous studies have found that, in comparison to neutral memories, 
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emotional memories tend to be remembered more vividly and be given higher ratings for their 
qualitative characteristics (Schaefer & Philippot, 2005; Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004).   
However, previous research has not examined how beliefs at the time of retrieval about 
the source of the attributed information might affect how vividly it is remembered.   
By manipulating participants’ beliefs about the sources at retrieval, in this study we evaluated 
whether the subjective qualities of memory are also subject to the same reconstructive processes 
as other aspects of episodic memory. 
Method 
 Participants. Sixty-one undergraduates (46 women, 15 men) participated for course 
credit.  Ages ranged from 17 to 21 (M = 18.7, SD = 1.0). An additional 6 participants did not 
return for the second session, and 1 participant did not follow instructions on the memory test 
and so that person’s results were not included in the analyses.   
 Materials and procedure.  The materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 
except that participants returned 1 week later rather than 2 days later for the second session, and 
on the memory tests, we asked participants not only to indicate which option each feature had 
been associated with, or whether it was new, but we also asked them to rate their confidence that 
the feature was associated with the option they attributed it to.  In addition, we asked them to 
rate: (a) how clearly they remembered their feelings and emotional reactions about the feature 
when they first made the choice; (b) how clearly they remembered any other non-emotional 
thoughts about this feature or associations to it when they first made the choice; and (c) overall, 
how vividly and clearly they remembered the feature or details about it.  Each of these ratings 
was made on a 1-5 scale ranging from not at all clear to very clear.  Participants were asked not 
to give these ratings for features they said were new. 
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At the top of the memory questionnaire for each choice scenario, we listed the two choice 
options, with one of them circled ahead of time by the experimenter.  We told participants that 
the option they selected last week was the one that was circled.  The first scenario tested was 
always the car choice, and the option participants had actually chosen was correctly circled for 
this one.  This served as a filler scenario to help establish the legitimacy of our reminders and 
was not included in the data analyses.  Participants were given correct reminders about the 
choices they had made for two of the other four scenarios and misinformed about the other two 
scenarios.  Which two scenarios had misleading reminders were counterbalanced across 
participants and the four scenarios were presented in random order.  
A final questionnaire served as a manipulation check for the deception about the chosen 
options. For each scenario, the same option was circled as on the source attribution test and 
participants were instructed to list two reasons they chose it, if they could remember.  In 
addition, for each scenario, they rated how well they remembered choosing that option (where 1 
= do not remember … 5 = very clearly remember). 
Results 
 Manipulation checks.  On the final questionnaire, 4 participants said they thought they 
had chosen a different option for at least one of the misleading-reminder scenarios.  In addition, 
another 9 participants left the “reasons why I picked this option” question blank for at least one 
of the misleading-reminder options.  As most (7) of these participants left the reasons fields 
blank for all five scenarios, this was probably an indication of forgetting or laziness rather than 
disbelief about having chosen a particular option.  However, to be conservative, in the 
subsequent analyses we only included the 48 participants who provided us with reasons why they 
had chosen each of the misleading-reminder options and who did not express any doubts about 
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having chosen those options.   
When asked how clearly they remembered choosing each option, the average rating was 
between a 3 (“somewhat remember choosing that [car/roommate, etc.]”) and a 4 (“fairly clearly 
remember choosing that [car/roommate, etc.]”) on the 5-point scale, with no significant 
difference between ratings for the two misleading-reminder choices (M = 3.34, SE = .11) and the 
two correct-reminder choices (M = 3.52, SE = .12), t(47) = 1.53, p = .13. Thus, we appear to 
have been successful at convincing these participants that they chose the options we indicated 
they had chosen. 
 Memory accuracy. Hits, false alarms, and source attribution scores were calculated the 
same way as in Experiment 1 (see Table 4 for means). As in Experiment 1, memory tended to be 
better for negative features than positive features, but the difference was not as pronounced, with 
significant effects only seen for false alarms in the correct-reminder condition, t(47) = 2.02, p 
<.05, and the misleading-reminder condition, t(47) = 3.25, p <.01 (Rows 2 and 4 in Table 5).  
Comparisons of the correct-reminder and misleading-reminder conditions showed similar 
hit rates for the two conditions for both positive and negative features (all ts1), but source 
identification accuracy was higher in the correct-reminder condition than the incorrect-reminder 
condition for both positive features, t(47) = 4.12, p < .001, and negative features, t(47) = 4.16, p 
< .001. Thus, misleading participants about which option they had chosen did not affect their 
recognition accuracy, but did impair their source accuracy.   
Choice-supportive memory attributions.  Attributions of positive and negative features to 
the chosen or rejected options were examined in the same manner as in Experiment 1.  The top 
panel of Figure 2 presents the proportion of features attributed to the option remembered as 
chosen or rejected as a function of feature valence and type of reminder about the chosen option.   
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A 2 (feature valence: positive, negative) x 2 (option attributed to: told was chosen, told was 
rejected) x 2 (reminder:  correct, misleading) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted, and a 
significant feature valence x option-attributed-to interaction was found, F(1, 47) = 38.98, p < 
.001, p
2
=.45, without a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 47) = 0.81, p = .37.  As predicted, 
when participants were given a correct reminder about their choice, they attributed more positive 
features to the chosen option than to the rejected option, t(47) = 7.44, p < .001, though they did 
not attribute more negative features to the rejected option than to the chosen option, t(47) < 1. 
When participants were incorrectly informed as to which option they had chosen, they attributed 
significantly more positive features to the option they were led to believe they chose than to the 
option they actually chose, t(47) = 7.44,  p < .001, though they attributed only slightly but not 
significantly more negative features to the option they believe they rejected than to the option 
they actually rejected, t(47) = 1.63, p = .11. 
False alarms to new items were also examined to determine whether people made 
attributions of new items in a manner that favored the chosen over the rejected option.  These 
data are presented in the bottom panel of Figure 2. As in the analyses for studied items, a 2 x 2 x 
2 ANOVA showed a significant feature valence x option-attributed-to interaction, F(1, 47) = 
23.01, p < .001, p
2
=.33, and no significant three-way interaction F(1, 47) = 0.02, p = .96. When 
participants were given correct reminders as to which option was chosen, they attributed more 
positive features to the chosen option than to the rejected option, t(47) = 2.44, p < .02, and more 
negative features to the rejected option than to the chosen option, t(47) = 2.61, p < .01.  
Likewise, when participants were given incorrect reminders as to which option was chosen, they 
attributed more positive features to the option they believed they chose than to the option they 
believed they rejected, t(47) = 2.88, p < .01, and more negative features to the option they 
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believed they rejected than to option they believed they chose, t(47) = 2.61, p < .01.  
Asymmetry scores were computed using the same method as in Experiment 1 to further 
examine whether participants’ memory attributions favored the apparently chosen options (those 
circled by us) or not. Participants’ overall asymmetry scores were significantly greater than zero 
and thus revealed a bias favoring apparently-chosen options for both the correct-reminder 
scenarios (M = .47, SE = .08, t[47] = 5.56, p < .001) and the misleading-reminder scenarios (M = 
.50, SE = .11, t[47] = 4.62, p < .001).  Indeed, there was no significant difference between the 
conditions, t(47) = .28, indicating that participants were just as choice-supportive for options 
they had actually rejected but that we told them they had chosen as they were for the options for 
which our reminders were accurate.  A follow-up analysis computing asymmetry scores 
separately for correctly attributed old features, misattributed old features, and misattributed new 
features revealed significant choice-supportive asymmetry scores for each of these types of 
attributions, with no significant differences by type of attribution or condition (see the lower 
panel of Table 3 for means; all p > .5).  
Memorial features.  For analysis of the various subjective memorial characteristics 
(emotions, other thoughts, overall vividness), we coded each attribution of a feature to an option 
as choice-supportive or not choice-supportive, depending on whether the feature was positive or 
negative and the option was chosen or rejected (based on the options we told participants they 
had chosen, rather than on their actual choices). Separate 2 (attribution: choice-supportive or not) 
x 2 (reminder: correct or misleading) x 2 (feature valence: positive, negative) ANOVAs for each 
characteristic revealed that for each type of subjective rating, features attributed in a choice-
supportive fashion (positive features attributed to apparently chosen options and negative 
features to apparently rejected options) were rated more highly than features attributed in a non 
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choice-supportive fashion (p < .05 for all ratings; p
2
=.08, .17, .19, .21 for confidence, emotions, 
thoughts, and vividness, respectively; see Figure 3).  There were no significant effects of the type 
of reminder or significant interactions of type of reminder and attribution.  Thus, participants 
rated the features they attributed in a choice-supportive fashion as being more vividly 
remembered, even when the “chosen option” was actually the option they had rejected.   
 An interesting question is whether this inflation of the memorial characteristics of 
features attributed in a choice-supportive way occurred for the new features.  Not everyone 
falsely attributed new features to both chosen and rejected options, but among the 45 participants 
who did, new features attributed in a choice-supportive way were given higher average 
qualitative characteristic ratings (M = 3.02, SE = .10) than new features attributed in a non 
choice-supportive way (M = 2.77, SE = .13), t(44) = 2.05, p < .05.  This finding that a vividness 
inflation effect occurred for new features never seen before indicates that biases at the time of 
retrieval must help create the effect.   
Discussion 
 These findings further indicate that belief influences memory attributions for past choice 
options.  When participants are lead to believe that they chose a particular option, they remember 
relatively more positive attributes having been associated with the chosen option and more 
negative attributes with the rejected option.  These findings thus conceptually replicate and 
extend those from Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, participants’ beliefs about their choices were 
examined by comparing memory attributions when they correctly remembered which option they 
had chosen to their attributions when they misremembered which option they had chosen.  By 
directly manipulating people’s beliefs about their choices by providing them with correct or 
misleading reminders as to which option they had originally chosen in Experiment 2, we were 
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able to isolate the choice-supportive memory attribution biases seen to the beliefs held about 
their choice at retrieval.  Differences in memorability of features cannot alone account for these 
findings. 
The fact that relatively few participants questioned the misleading information they were 
given when they were told which of the options they had selected 1 week prior extends recent 
findings of “choice blindness” (Johansson, Hall, Sikstrom, & Olsson, 2005).   Participants asked 
to indicate which of two faces was most attractive and then handed one of the pictures and asked 
to describe their reasons for their choice rarely noticed when the experimenter surreptitiously 
swapped the pictures.  The participants gave reasons for choosing the face they had not chosen, 
just as our participants gave reasons for the choice we said they had made. Furthermore, in our 
study, when asked how clearly they remembered choosing each option, the average rating was 
between “somewhat” and “fairly clearly” remember choosing that option, and the subjective 
vividness of the memory for the choice was not significantly greater when they were asked about 
the choice they had really made than when they were misled about which choice they had made. 
Thus people’s subjective experience was that they were in fact remembering their choice from 
Session 1, even when they were misremembering it.     
It is important to put these findings in the context of overall rates of memory 
performance.  Even with the 1-week retention interval used in the present experiment, people’s 
overall recognition of the attributes was reasonably good (~80%). Thus it is not simply the case 
that people have little memory for the choices and their associated features and are simply 
guessing on the memory attribution test. The fact that they show similar patterns of source 
attributions for old items as well as for new items indicates that their attributions are guided by 
their belief as to which option was chosen. Although overall source attribution rates were low, 
Memory attributions   23 
this may be precisely the circumstance under which people are more likely to rely on beliefs 
about their chosen option to reconstruct their memory for the associated features. These 
reconstructive processes no doubt are a combination of actual memory experiences as well as 
processes such as guessing and reasoning (this issue is discussed further in the general 
discussion).  
Related to this point is the finding of greater source monitoring accuracy for scenarios in 
which correct reminders about choices were given than when misleading reminders were given, 
which is congruent with the finding in Experiment 1 of greater source monitoring accuracy when 
people correctly remember which option they chose than when they misremember. This finding 
suggests that beliefs help support accurate source attributions as well as influence inaccurate 
attributions.  For instance, having made a choice between two cars, people may correctly 
remember that “the option I chose had the comfortable seats.” If their belief about which option 
they chose is correct, they will have higher source attribution accuracy than if their belief about 
which option they chose is incorrect.  
By deceiving participants at retrieval about which option they had chosen, we were also 
able to examine the effects of beliefs about sources on the qualitative characteristics of the 
features attributed to them. For the confidence rating, we asked participants how confident they 
were that the feature had been associated with that option.  But the other ratings of qualitative 
characteristics were focused on the feature itself rather than on source memory (e.g., “How 
vividly and clearly do you remember this feature or details about it?”) Results indicated that 
participants were not only more confident about the source of features attributed in a choice-
supportive way, but also felt they remembered them more clearly than the features attributed in a 
non choice-supportive way.  This vividness inflation occurred both when they were misled about 
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which option they had chosen and when they were provided with correct reminders.  In addition, 
the vividness inflation also occurred for the new features that were falsely attributed to one of the 
two options.  Thus, this study suggests that features that support one’s beliefs in terms of what 
they are associated with feel more vivid at the time of retrieval.  
General Discussion 
 When remembering the features of past choice options, people have a choice-supportive 
bias in the way that they attribute these features (Mather & Johnson, 2000; Mather et al., 2000, 
2003). Previous studies reveal circumstances under which choice-supportive biases are more 
likely to be shown.   For instance, younger adults show more choice-supportive biases when 
induced to think about their emotions about the choice (Mather & Johnson, 2000). People do not 
show choice-supportive biases when a computer randomly selects the chosen option (Benney & 
Henkel, 2006).   
This latter research is consistent with the idea that beliefs about the chosen option may 
play a critical role, because choice-supportive biases are found when people are likely to believe 
that the option chosen was superior but not when they are unlikely to have that belief (e.g., when 
the choice is randomly made). However, the cause of the bias was not clear from these previous 
studies, as the process of making a choice provides many opportunities for bias (e.g., Mather et 
al., 2005).  Selective attention at the time of encoding may make choice-supportive features more 
memorable later (Brownstein, 2003; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). Additionally, 
faced with cognitive dissonance about the positive features of the rejected option and the 
negative features of the chosen option, people may distort their memories immediately after 
making a choice in order to resolve their psychological discomfort (Elliot & Devine, 1994; 
Festinger, 1957).  The present studies investigate whether the belief at the time of retrieval that 
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one chose Roommate A and rejected Roommate B is in itself enough to create a choice-
supportive memory bias, even if which roommate is believed to have been the chosen one is 
erroneously remembered by the person or is randomly determined by the experimenter.   
Our results support the notion that beliefs at the time of retrieval are sufficient to create 
choice-supportive memory.  In Experiment 1 we examined instances in which people 
spontaneously misremember which of the options they chose.  In these cases, people showed 
memory biases favoring their believed choices rather than their actual choices. In Experiment 2, 
we manipulated people’s beliefs by misinforming them about which option they selected earlier.  
Participants had choice-supportive biases in memory for whichever option we told them they had 
chosen, whether or not they had actually chosen it.  In addition, we found that when feature 
attributions favored the believed choice, those features were rated as being remembered more 
vividly with more associated phenomenal characteristics than when the feature attributions 
favored the other option. This finding that beliefs about what option was chosen and what option 
was rejected plays a critical role in memory reconstruction adds to our current understanding of 
choice-supportive memory bias by providing insights into a critical cause of the phenomenon.   
  One question we have received in response to these findings is how much they reflect 
“real” memory processes versus nonmemorial judgment processes involving guessing or 
reasoning.  From the perspective of the source-monitoring framework, this is a false dichotomy, 
as memory is inextricably intertwined with judgment processes (Johnson et al., 1993).  In order 
to interpret a currently activated mental representation (e.g., the statement “high mileage on 
odometer”) as corresponding with a past event rather than just a new perception or thought, 
heuristic and systematic judgment processes must indicate that the qualitative features of the 
mental activation meet the criteria for a match with some source, such as one of the cars 
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previously read about. Thus a currently activated mental representation is experienced as “a 
memory,” even when it is based on misinformation (here, about the option that was chosen).  
Findings from Experiment 2 are consistent with this view.  Very few participants caught onto the 
deceptive nature of the reminders we provided about their choices, and almost all were willing to 
provide reasons why they made their choice (see also Johansson et al., 2005).  They reported 
moderate to high levels of confidence and vividness for the choices that they misremembered as 
well as for the choices they correctly remembered.  Thus their subjective experience was that 
they were remembering in both cases. The present findings as well as numerous other studies 
attest to the fact that people’s subjective experience of remembering can be quite erroneous (e.g., 
when people claim to “remember” having heard words on a list that were never presented, 
Mather et al., 1997; Norman & Schacter, 1997; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Furthermore, 
overall recognition rates illustrate that people’s general sense for what did and did not occur in 
the present study was reasonably intact.  While source attribution accuracy rates were modest at 
best in the current studies, it is likely the case that that is precisely the circumstance under which 
beliefs are more likely to guide memory reconstruction, as is found in studies examining 
situations in which people are more likely to rely on schemas to guide their remembering (e.g., 
Mather & Johnson, 2003; Mather et al., 1999; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002).  Future research can 
more closely examine whether decisions that are more meaningful and important are less likely 
to be impacted by beliefs and reconstructive memory biases, though certainly studies have 
suggested that even in many complex and meaningful everyday experiences, biases in memory 
can occur, such as when people remember their high school and test grades as higher then they 
actually were (Bahrick, Hall, & Berger, 1996), women remember their pregnancy and childbirth 
experiences as more positive than they had documented at the time in their journals (Smith, 
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1994), and older adults remember their past health and well-being as better than they originally 
reported (Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004).  
According to the source monitoring framework, both the qualitative features of activated 
information and general knowledge influence source judgments (Johnson et al., 1993). Our 
findings not only demonstrate that beliefs about which option was chosen play a significant role 
in reconstructing memories of past choices, but that beliefs can influence the qualitative 
characteristics that comprise the subjective experience of remembering as well. This finding that 
manipulating people’s beliefs influences the vividness of their memories has both practical and 
theoretical implications.  Consider, for example, this finding in the context of social persuasion:  
Tactics that manipulate a consumer’s beliefs about whether they previously chose an option can 
potentially alter the person’s recollection and the vividness of the features comprising their 
memory.  From a theoretical standpoint, models of memory must consider the complex interplay 
between mental representation and beliefs. Previous studies have examined qualitative 
characteristics to shed light on how various types of memories differ and how the nature of the 
qualitative features help determine source attributions (e.g., Comblain, D'Argembeau, & Van der 
Linden, 2005; Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1990; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; 
Mather et al., 1997; Norman & Schacter, 1997; Schaefer & Philippot, 2005; Talarico et al., 
2004). The present findings indicate that the qualitative features of memories not only serve as 
input for source judgment processes, but that they are also likely to be influenced by one’s 
beliefs at the time of retrieval.  The interactive nature of the memorial characteristics and general 
knowledge about the situation may help make belief-consistent memory distortion seem more 
vivid and realistic than belief-inconsistent errors in source monitoring. 
 In conclusion, the present studies demonstrate the important role that beliefs play in 
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reconstructing memories about past choices.  The malleability of beliefs and memory attributions 
based on those beliefs observed here, although troubling perhaps in some regards as to how 
erroneous people’s memories can be, are likely the byproducts of a cognitive system that 
generally is efficient at compensating for memories that become impoverished over time. In 
addition, it may well be the case that by having a memory system that is guided at times by our 
current beliefs, people are able to maintain a greater sense of satisfaction and well being with the 
choices they have made in their lives. 
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Footnotes
 
1
 The asymmetry score calculation performed for each person on each choice scenario is outlined 
below (for more detail and discussion, see Mather et al., 2000).  The extent to which the person’s 
memory attributions favored an option (call it option A) was computed by subtracting the 
proportion of attributions favoring the competing option (option B) from those favoring A 
(positive features attributed to Option A and negative features attributed to Option B both favor 
Option A).  The resulting sums were then converted to z-scores such that the mean value across 
all participants was zero.  Relative to the mean, a positive value indicates that the person's 
attributions favor option A, whereas a negative value indicates favoring of option B. This score 
was left intact for those who chose option A (thus capturing the extent to which they favored 
their chosen option), whereas for people who chose option B, the score was multiplied by -1.  
This formula was repeated for separate subcomponents, such as just the features correctly 
attributed and just the new features incorrectly attributed to an option.   
2
  In Experiment 1, the ratios of people choosing one option over another for each of the five 
scenarios ranged from a relatively even split or a slight favoring of one option (50:50, 61:39) to a 
stronger preference for one of the options (67:33, 78:22, 81:19). Similarly in Experiment 2, there 
were scenarios where the preference was not very pronounced (51:49, 54:46, 56:44) and 
scenarios with a more strongly preferred option (71:39, 74:26), one of which was the car 
scenario which was not included with the data analyses because it was a filler scenario.   
 
 Table 1 
 
Car Scenario Choice Options (Valence of Features was not Indicated for Participants) 
 
 
 
Option 1:  Red car  (5+, 5-) 
-  Hard to find service outlets 
-  Has a dent from a previous accident 
+  Seats are very comfortable 
+  Good handling on turns 
-  High mileage on odometer 
-  Makes an unidentified rattling sound 
+  Prestigious model 
+  Air conditioning included 
-  Doesn’t do well in bad weather 
+  Stereo included 
 
 
Option 2:  Black car (5+, 5-) 
-  No warranty 
-  Some rust on exterior 
+  High resale value 
+  Has airbags 
-  Needs a few repairs  
-  Not much trunk space 
+  Powerful engine  
+  Previous owner took good care of car 
-  Not fuel efficient  
+  Has a sun roof 
 
 Table 2 
Hits, False Alarms, and Source Identification Accuracy for Positive and Negative Features in 
Experiment 1 (SEs given in parentheses) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Proportion Attributed       Feature Valence 
     Positive Negative Mdiff (95% CI) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Correctly Remembered Which Option Was Chosen (n = 80) 
Hits to Studied Items   .82 (.01) .88 (.01) -.06 (.02) 
False Alarms to New Items  .43 (.02) .28 (.02) .15 (.03) 
Source Identification Accuracy .60 (.01) .68 (.01) -.08 (.03) 
 
Misremembered Which Option Was Chosen (n = 50) 
Hits to Studied Items   .83 (.02) .90 (.02) -.08 (.04)  
False Alarms to New Items  .47 (.05) .32 (.04) .14 (.10)  
Source Identification Accuracy .55 (.03) .56 (.02) .01 (.06)  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Table 3 
Choice-supportive Asymmetry Scores When Participants Correctly Believe They Chose the Chosen 
Option Versus When They Incorrectly Believe They Chose the Rejected Option in Experiments 1 and 
2 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Old Features   Old Features    New Features 
Correctly Incorrectly Incorrectly 
Attributed Attributed Attributed  
 
Experiment 1 
Correct Belief  .26 (.08) .18 (.08) .25 (.09) 
 Incorrect Belief .46 (.14) .50 (.14) .41 (.14) 
Experiment 2 
Correct Belief  .41 (.08) .40 (.09) .36 (.10) 
 Incorrect Belief .41 (.11) .47 (.11) .42 (.13) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Positive scores indicate a bias in favor of the option believed to be the chosen option.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses.   
 
 Table 4 
Hits, False Alarms, and Source Identification Accuracy for Positive and Negative Features in 
Experiment 2 (SEs given in parentheses) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Proportion Attributed         Feature Valence 
     Positive Negative Mdiff (95% CI) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Correct-Reminder Scenarios  
Hits to Old Items   .79 (.02) .82 (.02) -.03 (.02) 
False Alarms to New Items  .37 (.04) .30 (.03) .08 (.08) 
Source Identification Accuracy .60 (.02) .61 (.02) -.01 (.04) 
 
Misleading-Reminder Scenarios 
Hits to Old Items   .79 (.02) .80 (.02) -.01 (.03) 
False Alarms to New Items  .38 (.03) .27 (.03) .11 (.07) 
Source Identification Accuracy .47 (.02) .48 (.02) -.01 (.04) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Figure Captions 
Figure 1.  Proportion of features attributed to the option believed to be chosen or rejected as a 
function of valence of feature in Experiment 1 (error bars represent SE). The top panel represents 
attributions for studied features, and the bottom panel represents attributions for new features. 
Figure 2. Proportion of features attributed to the option believed to be chosen or rejected as a 
function of valence of feature in Experiment 2 (error bars represent SE). The top panel represents 
attributions for studied features, and the bottom panel represents attributions for new features. 
Figure 3.  Memorial characteristic ratings for features from scenarios in Experiment 2 for 
which participants’ beliefs about which options they chose were correct (correct reminder compared 
with those for which their beliefs were wrong (misleading reminder).  Black bars indicate ratings for 
features attributed in a choice-supportive (CS) fashion and white bars indicate ratings for features 
attributed in a non choice-supportive (NCS) fashion.  Error bars indicate the standard error of the 
mean.   
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